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THOMAS JEFFERSON'S RELIGIOUS VIEWS AND
THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE SUPREME COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
David Little*
In The Americans: The Colonial Experience, Daniel Boorstin suggests
that one of the characteristics of the "American frame of mind" is the "belief
that the reasons men give for their actions are much less important than the
actions themselves,"' and he associates this belief with the Founding Fathers.
This essay will summarize the pervasiveness and significance of this belief
with regard to Thomas Jefferson's views of religion and of the relation of
religion to the civil order. 2 It will also explore, in a very preliminary manner,
the influence of this belief-with its implicit disparagement of all reasons for
action, including religious reasons-on the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the first amendment. Toward this end, the opinions of the Court in two
late 19th-century decisions, Reynolds v. United States3 and Davis v. Beason
4
will be analyzed. Reynolds is the Court's earliest discussion of the "free ex-
ercise" clause of the first amendment, and it is there that Jefferson's famous
phrase regarding "the wall of separation between Church and State" made
its first appearance in judicial literature. Davis draws heavily on the conclu-
sions reached in Reynolds.
In both these decisions, the Court found the Mormon practice of polygamy
to be a crime, regardless of the religious beliefs which supported the practice;
and in justifying its opinion, the Court relied on Jefferson's writings. It is
this author's contention that however beneficial Jefferson's influence was in
some respects, his views also had a befuddling effect on the reasoning of the
* Professor of Religious Studies, University of Virginia. B.A., 1955, College of
Wooster; B.D., 1958, Union Theological Seminary; Th.D., 1963, Harvard University.
1. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 151 (1958).
2. For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see D. Little, The Origins of
Perplexity: Civil Religion and Moral Belief in the Thought of Thomas Jefferson, in
R. RICHEY & D. JONES, AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION 185-210 (1974).
3. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
4. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
5. This phrase first appeared in a letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee
of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in A. KoCH & W. PEDEN,
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332-33 (1944).
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Court, particularly at the point of disparaging reasons and beliefs in relation
to action. A more detailed discussion of the connection between Jefferson's
religious views and the Reynolds and Davis decisions will follow in the second
part of this article.
I. JEFFERSON'S VIEWS OF RELIGION
In examining Jefferson's views of religion and of the relation of religion
to the civil order, we need to apply to his views the same kind of persistent
scrutiny he often applied to the views of his opponents. We shall be more
interested in what Jefferson did believe, than in what he rejected, despite
the fact that he himself was sometimes more attentive to the latter than he
was to the former.
Since we shall implicitly raise some objections to Jefferson's point of view,
let us take account of two cautionary comments. First, in some ways it is
more fashionable lately to debunk Jefferson than to defend him. Fawn
Brodie's book, Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History,6 sets the pace.
There is something unseemly about relishing the discovery of flaws, or of
alleged flaws, in the character and thought of national heroes. This is a
temptation to be resisted, especially in the case of a man of Jefferson's de-
served eminence. On the other hand, the greater the man, the more honest
scrutiny he can endure.
Second, although this article will question the frame of mind within which
Jefferson understood the relation of religion to the civil order, including his
famous doctrine of the separation of church and state, there is no doubt that
Americans have enjoyed important benefits as a result of Jefferson's success-
ful campaign to disestablish religion at the national level. Even some of
Jefferson's severest critics concede that his "record on religious liberty
was really quite exceptional" 7-vigorously defended and consistently put into
practice against profound resistance. What has had great benefits, however,
has also had some costs.
Let us now begin to identify the frame of mind in which Jefferson de-
veloped his views of religion, which in turn led to his doctrines of religious
liberty and the separation of church and state. What did Jefferson mean
by the famous words from his letter of 1802 to the Danbury Baptists?
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith
or worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions
6. F. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY (1974).
7, L, LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 21 (1963).
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only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that
act of the whole American people which declared that their legis-
lature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of sep-
aration between Church and State. Adhering to this expression
of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of con-
science, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those
sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights,
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.8
Further, what did Jefferson mean by the words from the Preamble to the
Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), that "our civil rights have
no dependence on our religious opinions?" 9
When Jefferson drew a bold line between "opinions" and "actions," as he
did in the first passage, or between "opinions" and "civil rights," as he did
in the second, he had more in mind than meets the eye. He made those
distinctions because he considered the opinions or beliefs of people to be
basically irrelevant and unimportant in respect to their actions. In conduct-
ing one's life, in acting properly, and in doing the right thing, there is a sure,
clear guide at hand that does not involve much thinking or deliberating, or
much worrying about different opinions and beliefs-that is, the sure, clear
guide of common sense. Jefferson was emphatic and explicit: this simple
guide is a sense, and one that has little need of what he calls "the uncertain
combinations of the head."'10 "This sense of right and wrong . . . is as much
a part of [human] nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling, . . . as
much a part of man as his leg or arm . . ... " And, he concludes, this
sense is "so much a part of our constitution that no error of reasoning
might lead us astray from its observation in practice.' 12
Jefferson believed this capability must be cultivated and tutored by means
of education. Moreover, government and the force of law is required to in-
tervene when a citizen's common sense fails him, that is, when he violates
his easily perceivable social duties. Generally, however, Jefferson was opti-
8. Letter to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 5 (emphasis
added).
9. Preamble to the Act for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), reprinted in
A. KocH & W. PEDEN, supra note-5, at 3i2. For a copy of Jefferson's original text
before deletions were made by various deliberative bodies that considered the document,
see J. BOYD, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545-47 (1950).
10. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 404.
11. Id. at 430-31. Jefferson belonged to the "sentimentalist" or "sensationalist"
branch of 18th-century moral intuitionism, a position that was distinctly and self-
consciously opposed to the rationalist branch of intuitionism. It is a serious mistake
to label Jefferson a "rationalist." See D. Little, supra note 2, at 206-07 nn.20 & 21.
12. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 636.
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mistic about the reliability and availability of common sense, if human beings
attempt to use it."s
Above all, Jefferson regarded himself as a scientist-a scientist in all
things, including human action. From Jefferson's point of view, to be a sci-
entist meant that truth in every aspect of life should and could be determined
by the scientific method--or, as he called it, the "experimental method"--
which employs seeing, hearing, feeling, and the other senses in ascertaining
truth. In settling issues, scientists focus on the observable data, so Jefferson
believed. They do not sit around theorizing and arguing about abstrac-
tions."4
When Jefferson applied his method to things like political disputes between
Tories and Whigs, he produced the most remarkable results. He wrote, after
the fashion of a scientist recording his observations about an experiment:
"The sickly, weakly, timid man, fears the people, and is a Tory by nature.
The healthy, strong and bold, cherishes them, and is formed a Whig by na-
ture." 15 We need hardly remind ourselves that Jefferson was formed a Whig
by nature! When it is possible to discern so easily who is right and wrong,
there is no need to take seriously theoretical disputes and arguments. In
fact, Jefferson agreed with Benjamin Franklin: "Disputes are apt to sour
one's temper, and disturb one's quiet. . . . [T]he [m]ultitude are more
effectively set right by [e]xperience, than kept from going wrong by [r]ea-
soning with them."' 6
In other words, Jefferson had a very simple, not to say naive, view of the
world. If only people were free to apply the scientific method to all areas
of experience, they would readily come to agree on what is right and wrong or
what is true and false. They would not need to worry over theoretical dis-
putes. People, after all, possess common sense, and they possess it univer-
sally.
This fundamental, pragmatic outlook affected Jefferson's thoughts about
education. He sought to provide an education that would be "useful and
practicable for us.' 7 In place of many of the "theoretical" subjects tradi-
tionally taught in Europe, Jefferson strongly recommended the study of agri-
culture in American colleges and universities.
It is the first in utility, and ought to be first in respect. The same
13. See D. BOORSTIN, THE LOST WORLD OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 165-66 (1948).
14. For a discussion of Jefferson's views about the "experimental method," see id. at
ch. 3.3.
15. XV THi WrrINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 492 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1903).
16. D. BOORSTN, supra note 1, at 153.
17. X The WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFERsoN 244 (A.E. Bergh ed. 1907).
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artificial means which have been used to produce a competition in
learning, may be equally successful in restoring agriculture to its
primary dignity in the eyes of men. It is a science of the very first
order.... .[It is] the crown of all other sciences .... I8
This pragmatic attitude was as true in religion as it was in everything else.
All doctrinal controversy among different groups within Christianity was,
when all was said and done, so much hot air. "When once we quit the basis
of sensation," Jefferson remarked, "all else is in the wind."' 9 Religious dis-
putes, like all arguments about theories and beliefs, simply distract people
from the sure, simple guide of common sense: they amount, he once wrote,
to "the charlatanry of the mind."
'20
Jefferson was sure in his belief that there was a God. But his God was not
the God of the preachers and theologians. He was the God who was easily
discovered, as we would expect, by sense experience, by observing the natural
order and harmony of the universe.2 1 He was "nature's God" of the Declara-
tion of Independence, and, as such, was not complicated or mysterious, nor
were his commandments so. They were simple and straightforward, for they
were the same ready directives we discover by consulting our common sense.
In fact, only if a religion conforms to the simple morality of common sense
is it acceptable. Again, one does not need much preaching, argument, or
discussion over doctrine to know that.
Among the religious traditions, including Judaism, with which Jefferson
was acquainted, Christianity was by far the most appealing to him; but this
was so only after Jefferson had abstracted the true, simple message of Jesus
"from the rubbish in which it is buried, easily distinguishable by its lustre
from the dross of His biographers, and as separable from that as the diamond
from the dunghill. ' ' 22 This meant, for example, sifting through the New Test-
ament so as to feature "the most sublime morality which has ever fallen from
the lips of man" by excising all "inferior" theological and theoretical mater-
ials. 23 Jefferson was absolutely sure that he was able to avoid all the diffi-
cult problems of exegesis and interpretation of Christian Scriptures, as of all
Sacred Scriptures, because he had the sure guide of common sense at his
disposal. Accordingly, the only thing worth knowing in religion is the com-
mon core of practical moral guidance that is the same the world over. And
it follows from this that dogmas, which vary from religion to religion, are,
18. D. BOORSTIN, supra note 13, at 217.
19. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 701.
20. D. BOORSTN, supra note 13, at 134, citing II THE WRMTINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 229 (A.E. Bergh ed. 1907).
21. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 706-07.
22. Id. at 694.
23. Id.
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as he said, "totally unconnected with morality. ' '24  The dogmas are thor-
oughly dispensable; they will blow away in the wind. The moral teaching
alone will be left.
We ought not leave the impression that Jefferson made no reference what-
soever to the importance of "reason and free enquiry" or, as he also put
it, "reason and experiment" in matters of religion. He did occasionally make
such references, as, for instance, in the Notes on Virginia.25 But it is in
the very same writing that he supported his reference to "open discussion" in
religion by belittling the relevance of religious differences in civil affairs.
The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are
injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to
say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket
[n]or breaks my leg. . . . [I]f a sect arises, whose tenets would sub-
vert morals, good sense has fair play, and reasons and laughs it out
of doors, without suffering the State to be troubled with it.26
Jefferson also stressed free debate among different religious points of
view in the Preamble to the Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, where
he asserted that such discussions lie beyond the regulation and restraint of
governmental power.27 But again, this is because the standards for imposing
and restricting governmental power "have no dependence on our religious
opinions," 28 but are derived from a surer, less adventitious source. The gov-
ernment may interfere in religious matters only "when [religious] principles
break out into overt acts against peace and good order," and themselves thus
cause a breach in the "wall of separation" that ought to exist between opin-
ion and action, and that must accordingly be protected by the government.2 9
In the opening sentences of the Preamble,80 Jefferson submits what appear
to be his own religious opinions in support of his view of the proper limita-
tions on governmental power:
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens, or by
civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author
of our religion . . .. 1
24. XII THE WRrrINos OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 315-16 (A.E. Bergh ed. 1907).
25. Jefferson, Notes on Virginia, in A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 187.
26. Id. at 275-77.
27. See J. BoYD, supra note 9, at 545.
28. Id. at 546.
29. Id.
30. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 313.
31. Id. at 311.
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In other words, Jefferson's expressed view of civil rights was dependent, up
to a point at least,32 on his religious opinions! If one did not share Jefferson's
opinions, as many in history have not, one might well come to different con-
clusions about the character and range of civil rights. What explains the ap-
parent contradiction on Jefferson's part is, 'I suggest, his belief that his own
religious interpretations were not in a class with the ordinary beliefs and opin-
ions of others, because his views were authenticated not by idle metaphysical
and theological speculation, but by the method of common sense.
3 3
Finally, in his letter to the Danbury Baptists, Jefferson reaffirmed the same
sharp distinction between opinion and action, not only in the interests of un-
trammeled religious discussion, but to make an additional point as well.
When he said he was "convinced that [man] has no natural right in opposi-
tion to his social duties,"'34 he meant that those actions which fit man to live
harmoniously in the civil order (and which are, of course, directly intuitable
by common sense), may not under any circumstances be overridden by other
32. In several portions of the original text of the Preamble, Jefferson elaborated on
his personal conviction that the mind is "altogether insusceptible of restraint," J. BOYD,
supra note 9, at 545; that "the opinions of men are not the object of civil government,
nor under its jurisdiction," id. at 546; and that God has chosen to extend our religion
"by its influence on reason alone," id. at 545. These statements, which were subse-
quently deleted, simply reinforce the fact that Jefferson introduced his own religious
convictions in support of the freedom of religion. The second deletion restates the
version of the "wall of separation" doctrine found in the letter to the Danbury Baptists.
The author notes his indebtedness to his colleague, David Levin, for calling attention
to these deleted passages (though Levin believes that they give evidence of a more
extensive liberality of spirit in Jefferson than the author allows). As Boorstin sees the
matter:
The Jeffersonians could view the dispute of metaphysicians and theologians
with detached amusement or indifference, because it is easy to tolerate anarchy
in a realm where one has never really entered and which one is glad to see dis-
credited ....
.. . The experimental method which the Jeffersonians had to profess in
order to get their practical scientific job done, carried with it ... an un-
considered dogmatism in matters of behavior and morals.
D. BOORSTIN, supra note 13, at 111.
Since the standard for right action, assumed by Jefferson to be so clear and in-
disputable, was also for him the standard for evaluating religious truth-for separating
"the diamond from the dunghill"-the selfsame "unconsidered dogmatism" similarly
characterized Jefferson's particular brand of religious belief.
33. Jefferson also appealed to "natural right" as the basis for the independence of
political activity from religious conviction. Presumably, that appeal might be inde-
pendent of any religious warrant. A. KocH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 312. Yet
Jefferson nowhere distinguished what might well be two very different sorts of appeal.
He did not do this because of his conviction that the same common sense underlies and
reveals both natural rights and "the plan of the Holy Author of our religion." Id. at
313.
34. Letter to a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 5.
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duties or beliefs. In that sense there can be no conflict between natural right
and social duties. Social duties, then, become the standard for appraising
and tolerating beliefs and opinions. In other words, to the extent beliefs and
opinions do not run afoul of the commonly perceivable social duties, they
are harmless and not to be hindered.
It might occur to some observers that Jefferson's view of what constituted
proper social duties (and therefore natural rights) rested on his own beliefs
and opinions, just as his view of what constituted "our civil rights" rested,
in part, on his beliefs and opinions regarding "the plan of the Holy Author
of our religion."'35 Ironically, that difficulty did not occur to Jefferson be-
cause, according to his theory, actions are so easily determined apart from
beliefs and opinions.
What is most remarkable about Jefferson's world is its simplicity, its tidi-
ness, and its lack of both perplexity and irreducible mystery. In his world,
nature, God, morality, and the civil order all blend together neatly and obvi-
ously. There are no conflicts, no tensions, or anything else that would drive
people with any sense of emotion to reflect, deliberate, question, or recon-
sider. The following characterization of Jefferson by Leonard Levy seems to
capture the person who lay behind this frame of mind: "Regret and remorse
are conspicuously absent from Jefferson's writings, as is reflective reconsid-
eration of a problem. Something in his makeup, more than likely a stupen-
dous ego, inhibited second thoughts. . . . Restatement, not reevaluation,
marked his thinking .... "136
Now we can begin to understand why Jefferson dismissed and discounted
as irrelevant distractions all beliefs, opinions, doctrines, and theories that did
not pass the test of the sure, simple standard of common sense. And it is
because all such beliefs were finally irrelevant and unimportant to Jefferson
that he believed they should be set apart and fenced off from the world of
action, the world of civil responsibility, by a "wall of separation." It was
not, as we are so often told, that Jefferson honored and respected differences
of opinion so much that he erected his famous wall. On the contrary, it
was because he honored and respected them so little.
II. JEFFERSON'S RELIGIOUS VIEWS AND THE SUPREME COURT
The two Supreme Court decisions to be discussed, Reynolds v. United
States 7 and Davis v. Beason,a8 illustrate some of the costs of Jefferson's view-
35. A. KocH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 311.
36. L. LEvy, supra note 7, at 172.
37. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
38. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
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point towards religion and its relation to civil action. As mentioned earlier,
both of these cases held the Mormon practice of polygamy to be a crime.
Several questions were decided in Reynolds, but only two are significant
for our purposes: "Should the accused have been acquitted if he married
the second time, because he believed it to be his religious duty?"; and "Did
the court err in that part of the charge which directed the attention of the
jury to the consequences of polygamy? '3 9 Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered
the unanimous opinion of the Court, answering both questions in the nega-
tive.
With respect to the first question, the Court found no reason why George
Reynolds, a practicing Mormon who had married a second wife, should be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.40 Reynolds had proven that he was an
active member of the Mormon church and that it was an accepted Mormon
belief that male members of the church had the duty, if possible, to practice
polygamy. The refusal to do so, they believed, would result in eternal dam-
nation.
According to Chief Justice Waite's opinion, "the question is raised, whether
religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made crim-
inal by the law of the land." 41 In response, the Chief Justice invoked, for
the first time, Jefferson's phrase from the letter to the Danbury Baptists con-
cerning the "wall of separation", and quoted the relevant portions of the
letter at length.42 He also quoted several passages from the Preamble to
the Act for Establishing Religious Freedom:
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advo-
cates of the measure [the first amendment], it may be accepted
almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of
the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legis-
lative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order.43
The concluding sentence constituted a key principle in Waite's reasoning. He
immediately proceeded to establish that so far as the western tradition was
concerned, polygamy was a "violation of social duties" and was "subversive
of good order." "Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe. . . . At common law, the second marriage was
39. 98 U.S. at 153.
40. Congress, in 1862, made bigamy a crime in the 'U.S. Territories. Act of July
1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1882).
41. 98 U.S. at 162.
42. id. at 164.
43. Id.
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always void (2 Kent, Com. 79), and from the earliest history of England
polygamy has been treated as an offence against society."' 44 Moreover, he
contended that plural marriage patterns would eventually produce a "patri-
archal principle," which, "when applied to large communities, fetters the
people in stationary despotism," 45 and undermines monogamy, as well as the
established principles of American government. In so doing, polygamy sub-
verts good order.
Given that the law of the land defines "social duties" and "good order,"
and further given that United States law deems plural marriages to be in
violation of these concepts, Waite concluded that a religious belief in favor
of practicing polygamy could not be allowed to excuse or exempt a person
from obeying the law.
To permit this would be to make professed doctrines of religious
beliefs superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only
in name under such circumstances ....
The only defence of the accused in this case is his belief that
the law ought not to have been enacted. It matters not that his
belief was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief, and
belief only ....
But when the offence consists of a positive act which is know-
ingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might
escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which
he had broken ought never to have been made. 40
With respect to the second question, Chief Justice Waite concluded that
the trial court judge's charge to the jury regarding the deleterious conse-
quences of polygamy was not prejudicial. 47  According to Waite, the Court
saw
no just cause for complaint in this case. Congress in 1862 (12
Stat. 501), saw fit to make bigamy a crime in the Territories. This
was done because of the evil consequences that were supposed to
44. Id.
45. Id. at 166.
46. Id. at 167.
47. Id. at 168. The charge had read:
I think it not improper, in the discharge of your duties in this case, that you
should consider what are to be the consequences to the innocent victims of
this delusion [the practice of polygamy]. As this contest goes on, they multiply,
and there are pure-minded women and there are innocent children ....
These are to be the sufferers; and as jurors fail to do their duty, and as these
cases come up in the Territory of Utah, just so do these victims multiply and
spread themselves over the land.
[Vol. 26:57
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flow from plural marriages. All the court did was to call the atten-
tion of the jury to the peculiar character of the crime for which the
accused was on trial, and to remind them of the duty they had to
perform. 48
One thing is clear about Waite's reasoning in this decision. Despite his
endorsement of Jefferson's division between belief and action, as well as of
Jefferson's view of the role of government regarding that division, Waite him-
self did not respect the division. The Court's decision turned out to reach
opinions and not actions only. In the first place, the sort of belief Reynolds
held was precisely a belief about action, a belief that is not truly "held" unless
it involves action. In believing intensely as a Mormon that he had a
duty to practice polygamy, Reynolds' belief was that polygamy ought to be
performed. Therefore, to prohibit Reynolds from acting on his belief was
necessarily to stand in judgment not only on the action, but also on the cor-
rectness of the belief.
In the second place, the Court necessarily substituted its own beliefs about
action for Reynolds' beliefs. The issue was not the restriction of actions
rather than beliefs. It was the restriction of one set of beliefs about action,
namely Reynolds', in favor of another set, namely the Court's. How else
are we to understand the implicit argument running throughout Waite's opin-
ion and inferred from Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists? The argu-
ment proceeds more or less as follows:
1. According to Jefferson, one has no natural right in opposition
to his social duties. This means that one's social duties are
always right, and violations of social duties always wrong. 49
2. The social duties appropriate for American citizens are self-
evident from American history as well as America's Western
European heritage, according to which polygamy is a violation
of social duty.50
3. Since polygamy is a violation of social duty, and since no one
has a natural right in opposition to his social duties, the per-
formance of polygamy is always wrong.
The conclusion of this syllogism clearly follows from the major and minor
premises; but, as stated, those premises raise some questions. The major
premise needs clarification and defense, though one of the reasons that such
is not provided is because of Jefferson's commitment to common sense.
When one can perceive things directly and simply, what need is there for
48. Id.
49. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
50. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
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rational clarification and justification? That is what theoreticians do, and
we know what Jefferson thought of them. However, Jefferson's commit-
ments and convictions, which lie behind Waite's opinion, cannot hide the fact
that his assumptions, and therefore Waite's, comprise a set of beliefs about
right and wrong action that are not, ,at least to this author, "self-evident."
This is also true of the minor premise. It may not be entirely fair to tax
Jefferson with Waite's appeal to the history of law as the way to determine
social duties, though part of the problem with Jefferson's position is precisely
the indeterminacy of his method for knowing what counts as a social duty
and what does not. In fact, Waite's way of determining social duties does
not seem altogether illegitimate, given the vagueness of Jefferson's "method."
In any case, we are faced with a set of beliefs about action which dic-
tates that what a large number of people has considered odious is odious.
To say the least, that belief also needs clarification and defense, for it is the
very belief which Reynolds challenged.
Waite's arguments with respect to "good order" similarly place one set of
beliefs about action against another. If it is true, as Waite alleged, that poly-
gamy would eventually undermine monogamy and the principles of democra-
tic government, then there is reason for the government to interfere with Mor-
mon beliefs about polygamy in the interests of beliefs about monogamy and
democracy. Some such interference is undoubtedly unavoidable, but then
it is once more clear that the legislative powers of government do in fact
reach opinions and not actions only.
We can draw the same conclusion from Waite's response to the question
regarding the alleged error in the trial court's statement to the jury noting
the consequences of polygamy. The charge to the jury, which Waite found
acceptable, is permeated with value-laden beliefs about action. 51 To label
the practice of polygamy a "delusion," and to speak unconditionally of "pure-
minded women" and "innocent children" as "victims" and "sufferers" of "the
evil consequences" of polygamy presupposes a rather vivid set of beliefs
about right and wrong action. Needless to say, if one were a Mormon and
supported polygamy on religious grounds, he would find the application of
those terms anything but self-evident. On the other hand, Waite's acquies-
cense suggests he did not find the utilization of those terms inappropriate.
In the closing pages of the opinion, Waite made a comment that differed
in tone and direction from the foregoing arguments. This comment por-
trayed the conflict of religious belief and social duty as it relates to the needs
of maintaining a government and a legal system, rather than viewing it simply
as an issue of right and wrong beliefs. Waite rejected the idea that an appeal
to religious belief can excuse criminal behavior on the grounds that anarchy
51. See note 47 supra.
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would then replace the rule of law, and "government could exist only in
name."'52 Even under the terms of this more functional and pragmatic argu-
ment, however, the legislative powers of government would still reach opinion
as well as actions. Since the maintenance of any government would neces-
sitate agreement on some beliefs about action, state interference would be
required in the event that certain contrary beliefs appeared.
Reynolds exhibits some of the oversimplifications and confusions regarding
Jefferson's distinction between belief and action. These defects become
clearer and more blatant in Davis v. Beason,53 a case that refers extensively
to Reynolds.
Samuel Davis, a Morman, wished to vote in an election in his home terri-
tory of Idaho. Toward this end he took an oath, according to an Idaho law,5 4
which, among other things, contained the following provision:
[N]o person who is a bigamist or polygamist, or who teaches, ad-
vises, counsels or encourages any person or persons to become
bigamists or polygamists, or to commit any other crime defined
by law, or to enter into what is known as plural or celestial mar-
riage, or who is a member of any order ... which teaches, advises,
counsels or encourages its members or devotees or any other per-
sons to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy... is permitted
to vote at any election, or to hold any position . . . within this
Territory. 55
Davis was then convicted for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of the
laws of the territory by seeking to register as a voter while knowingly belong-
ing to the Mormon church. On appeal before the Supreme Court, Davis re-
lied on several contentions, but Mr. Justice Field, delivering the unanimous
opinion of the Court, reviewed only the legality of the law that withheld the
right to vote from those who "teach, advise, counsel or encourage" polygamy
and who would not promise to desist from such activity.
On this point, Field stated, "there can be no serious discussion or difference
of opinion."' 56 He noted:
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and
Christian countries. They are crimes by the laws of the United
States, and they are crimes by the laws of Idaho. They tend to
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of
families, to degrade woman and debase man. Few crimes are more
52. 98 U.S. at 167.
53. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
54. IDAHO REv. STAT. § 501 (1887).
55. Id., quoted in 133 U.S. at 333.
56. 133 U.S. at 341.
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pernicious to the best interests of society and receive more general
or more deserved punishment. To extend exemption from punish-
ment for such crimes would be to shock the moral judgment of the
community. To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend
the common sense of mankind.57
The last sentence is of special interest to us in light of Jefferson's views of
religion and common sense. Field elaborated on the point there made:
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relations to
his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his
being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is often con-
founded with the cultus or form of worship of a particular sect,
but is distinguishable from the latter. 58
Whether or not Jefferson may be blamed for the precise formulation of this
point, Field's assertions parallel very closely Jefferson's basic position.
For Jefferson, it will be recalled, the sure, clear guide of common sense estab-
lished a standard by which to distinguish the worthy from the unworthy in
religion. What was worthy in religion was of course that which conformed
to the social duties dictated by common sense. To Jefferson, as well as to
Field, common sense could only yield as the preferred religious point of
view-or, in Jefferson's words, "the plan of the Holy Author of our relig-
ion" 59-a highly liberalized but still recognizable version of Christianity.
Equipped with this sure common sense standard, there is no particular diffi-
culty, no perplexity, about knowing which acts are, as Field stated, "inimical
to the peace, good order, and morals of society."60 Therefore, there is no par-
ticular difficulty identifying which "tenets of religion" are valid and which
are not.
As indicated above, the judgment Field made on matters of morality and
religion is more self-assured, more absolute, and more unqualified, than
Waite's opinion in Reynolds. This may partly be due to certain character
traits peculiar to Field."' However, we still cannot help but note the striking
57. Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 342.
59. A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, supra note 5, at 311.
60. 133 U.S. at 342.
61. Mr. Justice Field's judicial and personal convictions may have been interwoven.
A profoundly moral tone pervaded many of his judicial utterances; legal is-
sues were stated in ethical terms; 'right' rather than precedent tended to be the
guiding consideration. And conjoined to this preoccupation with normative
questions was a remarkable sense of certainty concerning the answers. Field
did not believe something to be right-he knew it to be; and the self-righteous-
ness thereby generated was a dominant feature of his juridical personality.
McCloskey, Conservatism and Constitutionalism: Stephen I. Field, in AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE, 1865-1910 at 88 (1951).
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similarities between the approaches of Jefferson and Field. At the very least,
it is fair to conclude that Jefferson's views of religion, belief, and action pro-
vide a congenial background for Field's absolutism.
The oversimplifications and unexamined assumptions regarding beliefs
about action that were uncovered in our investigation of Reynolds leap
out at us in Davis. There is not the slightest hesitation in the latter opinion
to disparage as unworthy basic Mormon beliefs about polygamy, or to employ
the force of law in interfering with the implementation of those beliefs.
Moreover, the normative assumptions of Field and the Court he represented
are as manifest as they are undefended. The reference to "the common
sense of mankind" reflects the Jeffersonian belief in a universal common
sense that readily reveals right and wrong action to those who are in their
"right" senses. But that is a belief, and, so far as this author is concerned,
one whose status is anything but self-evident. The same holds true for
Field's convictions that polygamy tends to "degrade woman and debase man,"
and that ",[f]ew crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society."
62
Those contentions are true only given the truth of certain more basic beliefs
about what is and what is not valuable for human beings. Considered from
Davis' point of view, the fulfillment of a command of God certainly would
not be regarded as degrading to women or debasing to men.
In criticizing Reynolds and Davis, this article suggests neither that the
Court was wrong to consider matters of value-belief and commitment, nor
that it was mistaken in not respecting scrupulously enough Jefferson's
wall of separation between belief and action. Nor is there contained
herein a suggestion that the Court made the wrong value judgments regarding
polygamy and the alleged threat it represented to the social fabric. Nor,
finally, is there an implication that because interference with some beliefs
is inevitable, that the Court should interfere, with slight discretion, in all
matters of belief and opinion. What is suggested is that the Court, like all
agencies of civil order, cannot avoid at times involvement in the sphere of
belief, and, as in the Mormon cases, of passing judgment by implication on
the correctness of beliefs.
While the Court did not explicitly take a religious position in the decision
against the Mormons, it did nevertheless assume a stance that bore directly
on the religious beliefs of Mormons, and that position made the "free exer-
cise" of some of those beliefs impossible. The regulation and direction of
the civil order itself depends on adopting a set of beliefs and values about
the world that necessarily has implications for religious beliefs. To ignore
62. 133 U.S. at 341.
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that fact is to obscure one's vision by hiding behind a misplaced wall of separ-
ation.
I. CONCLUSION
A review of these two early cases demonstrates what should have been
obvious but for the confusions created by a Jeffersonian approach to these
questions. The sharp distinction between belief and action is mistaken. All
of us engage in the actions we consider to be significant on the basis of be-
liefs we hold about those actions. If beliefs differ, actions may also differ.
A person can succeed in tearing beliefs and actions apart, and delude himself
that he is judging the one and not the other, only if he has first accepted
a theory like Jefferson's which minimizes the importance and relevance of
the reasons behind our actions.
The matter of interpreting the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment is a difficult and complicated affair. It involves a delicate balancing
and compromising of divergent beliefs, interests, and duties. !It is difficult
to find any simple formula for settling such conflicts. Therefore, those
charged with the responsibility of making the necessary determinations ought
to be fully aware of how involved and complex the process is, both legally
and intellectually. It is submitted that the Supreme Court's earliest interpre-
tations of the first amendment indicate that the direction provided by Jeffer-
son in this respect often obscures, rather than clarifies, this process.
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